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ACCOUNT.
Attachment of Balance due.-Aritration.-In an action for an ac-
count and the recovery of money, where the defendant admits his indebt-
edness to the plaintiff in a certain sum, but sets up that a judgment-
creditor of the plaintiff has a suit in aid of execution then pending
against the plaintiff and defendant, in which such indebtedness is sought
to be subjected to the payment of his judgment: Eeld, that it is error
to render judgment for the amount -so admitted to be due, until such
judgment-creditor is made a party, or his right in the premises is deter-
mined Benson's Adm. v. Stein, 34 Ohio St.
But where a judgment is so erroneously rendered, the error is cured
whenever it is made to appear of record in the case that such action in
aid of execution has been dismissed by the party: Id.
Where, in an action to compel the statement of an unsettled account
between the joint owners of a steamboat, with a prayer for a judgment
for the amount that may be found due to the plaintiff, the defendant
answers that the amount due the plaintiff has been ascertained and fixed
by an award upon submission to a third person, and the plaintiff replies,
admitting the submission and award, and asks judgment thereon, there
is no such departure in pleading as will vitiate a judgment for the
amount admitted to be due by the answer. The judgment in such case
rests on the petition and answer, and not on the reply: Id.
ACTION.
Suit to -recover back Compulsory Payments.-Payment made under
stress of a legal process is compulsory, and if unlawfully exacted, the
person making it can sue to recover it back: Peoyle ex rel. Gebhart v.
East Saginaw, 40 Mich.
Mandamus to compel payment to a contractor from a special assess.
ment, was denied where the assessment had been adjudged invalid in a
suit brought by a tax-payer to recover back what he had paid: Id.
ASSIGNMENT. See Debtor and Creditor.
I Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions
filed during Oct. Term 1878. The cases will probably be reported in 7 or 8 Otto.
2 From John Hooker, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 45 Conn. Reports.
3 From J. Shaaf Stockett, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 48 Md. Reports.
' From H. A. Chaney, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 40 Michigan Reports.
5 From T. K. Skinker, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 68 Mo. Reports.
6 From E. L. DeWitt, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 34 Ohio State Reports.
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BILLS AND NOTES. See Set-off.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See Taxation.
Coorations-Impairing Obligation of (,ontrats-Statute.-By the
statutory code of Georgia, which came in force January 1st 1863, it waa
enacted that pritate corporations were subject to be changed, modified
or destroyed at the will of the creator, except so far as the law forbids
it, and that in all cases of private charters thereafter granted, the state
reserved the right to withdraw the franchise, unless such right is
expressly negatived in the charter. Two railroad corporations created
prior to 1863, each of which enjoyed by its chartef a limited exemption
from taxation, were consolidated by virtue of an act of the legislature,
passed on the 18th of April 1863, which authorized a consolidation of
their stocks, conferred upon the consolidated companies full corporate
powers, and continued to it the franchises, privileges and immunities
which the companies held by their original charters: Held, 1. That by
the consolidation a new corporation was created, and the original com-
panies were dissolved. 2. That the new corporation became subject to
the provision of the code which reserved the right of the legislature to
withdraw its charter, or to change, modify or destroy it. 3. That a sub-
sequent legislative act taxing the property of the corporation as other
property in the state is taxed, was not prohibited by that provision of
the Constitution of the United States which denies to a state the power
of passing a law impairing the obligation of contracts : Atlantic and
Gulf Railroad Co. v. State of Georgia, S. C. U. S. Oct. Term 1878.
The judgment of the highest court of a state, that a statute has been
enacted in accordance with the requirements of the state constitution, is
is conclusive upon this court, and it will not be reviewed: Id.
CONTEMPT.
Habeas Corpus.-The regularity of a committal for contempt in refus-
ing to pay alimony will not be reviewed on an application for the writ
of habeas corpus, if it was regular on its face: In re Bissell, 40 Mich.
COPYRIGHT.
What constitutes an .nfrinement.-The complainants were owners of
a copyright of a series of maps of the city of New York, prepared for
the use of those engaged in the business of fire insurance, the title of
which was as follows: "Maps of the city of New York, surveyed under
the direction of insurance companies of said city, by William Perris,
civil engineer and surveyor, 1852. Volume 1, comprising the 1st, 2d,
3d and 4th wards." The maps exhibit each lot and building, and the
classes as shown by the different coloring and characters set forth in the
reference. The maps were made after a careful survey and examination
of the lots and buildings in the enumerated wards of the city, and were
so marked with arbitrary coloring and signs, explained by a reference, or
key, that an insurer could see at a glance what were the general charac-
teristics of the different buildings within the territory delineated, and
many other details of construction and occupancy necessary for his infor-
mation when taking risks The defendant made the necessary examina-
tion and survey, and published a similar series of maps for Philadelphia.
At first he used substantially the same system of coloring, signs and key,
but afterwards changed his signs somewhat, and his key: Held, that the
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publication of the defendant did not infringe the copyright of the com-
plainants: Perris v. Hexamer, S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1878.
A simple copyright of a map does not give a publisher an exclusive
right to the use upon other maps of the particular signs and key which
he saw fit to adopt for the purpose of his delineations: Id.
CORPORATION. See Constitutional Law ; Municipal Corporaton.
Charter- Validity not impeachable collaterally-Estoppel-Res Ad.
judicata.-Tbe validity of the articles of incorporation of an associa-
tion cannot be inquired into incidentally and collaterally: Keene v.
Van Reuth, 48 Md.
A party to proceedings in equity under which the title to property
has been acquired, is estopped from disputing the title so acquired: Id.
Consolidation of-Rights of New Cororation-Equity.-A general
law of the state of New York authorized any railroad companies having
continuous lines to unite and form a single corporation. Two railroad
companies owning roads, one of which was wholly within that state and
the other partly within that state and partly within the state of Uon-
necticut, made an agreement to consolidate, and took all the formal mea-
sures required to accomplish it, but a question was made as to the va-
lidity of the consolidation by reason of the roads not having at the time
a completed continuous track. A resolution of the legislature of Con-
necticut had provided that, whenever a company owning the road lying
partly within this state should be consolidated with any other company
in the state of New York, in pursuance of the laws of that state, the new
company should have all the rights within this state that were possessed
by the old: Held, 1. That an act subsequently passed by the legislature
of New York recognising the consolidated corporation as in existence,
validated and established the agreement under which the consolidation
was made. 2. That when the legal existence of the new corporation in
the state of New York became thus established, it satisfied the require-
ments of the Connecticut act, and the new company became possessed
of all the rights in this state which had been possessed by the old com-
pany: Head v. N. Y., Housatonic & Northern Railroad Co., 45 Conn.
The new corporation succeeded to the power possessed by the old
company, both in this state and in the state of New York, to issue its
bonds to an amount necessary for completing its road, and to mortgage
its property and franchise for their security: Id.
And this power included the power to issue its bonds in exchange for,
and to take up, bonds previously issued by the old company and secured
by a mortgage of its property: Id.
A bill in equity alleged that the new corporation duly issued its bonds
and disposed of a large number of them to divers persons, who were
bona fide holders of the same and entitled to receive the money due
thereon and to the benefit of the mortgage; Held, to be a sufficient
averment that the bonds were lawfully issued and used: Id.
After the bonds were issued and the mortgage executed, and while
both were outstanding unsatisfied, but before the mortgage had been re-
corded, a creditor of the company, with knowledge of all the facts, attached
and afterwards levied his execution upon the mortgaged property : Held,
that he stood no better than if, with such knowledge, he had taken a
conveyance of the property, and that he did not obtain priority of title: Id.
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A court of chancery in this state has jurisdiction of a bill for the fore-
closure of such a mortgage, although embracing property out of this
state as well as within it: Id.
It is a well-established principle that a court of chancery, acting pri-
marily in personam and not merely in rem, may, where a person against
whom relief is sought is within the jurisdiction, make a decree, upon
the ground of a contract or an equity subsisting between the parties, re-
specting property situated out of the jurisdiction : Id.
COUNTY. See Municipal Bonds.
CRIMINAL LAW. See Limitations, Statute of.
Absence of Prisoner.-It is no ground for the reversal of a judgment,
that a motion for a new trial was made, argued and overruled in the
absence of the prisoner, where no objection was made till after sen-
tence: Griffin v. The State, 34 Ohio St.
Absence of Prisoner during T-lal-Evidence-Reputation.-The fact
that the prosecuting attorney began his closing argument to the jury
while the defendant was temporarily absent from the court room, will
not warrant the reversal of a judgment of conviction, in the absence of
evidence that the defendant was prejudiced thereby, or that any sub-
stantial portion of the argument was made before his return : State v.
Grate, 68 Mo.
A witness who is well acquainted with a person whose character is in
question, and lives in his neighborhood, will be allowed to testify to his
general reputation, although he may never have heard it discussed or
questioned. Frequently the highest evidence which can be offered of
character is of this negative kind: Id.
Evidence-Bigamy--Mormonism.-If a witness is kept away by the
adverse party, his testimony, taken on a former trial between the same
parties upon the same issues, may be given in evidence: Reynolds v.
United States, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1878.
In an indictment for bigamy, it is no defence that the accused was a
member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, commonly
called the Mormon Church, and that he married the second time because
he believed it to be his religious duty: Id.
Murder-Evdence.-On an indictment for murder the prisoner's
counsel offered to prove by the widow of the murdered man that he.
husband was jealous of her, and had accused her of being too intimate
with other men than the prisoner, and stated to the court at the time
of the offer that he proposed to follow up this proof by evidence tending
to prove that the killing for which the prisoner was indicted grew out
of a quarrel between the prisoner and the deceased, occasioned by the
deceased having charged the prisoner with being too intimate with the
wife of the deceased: Reld, that the proof offered, whether considered
by itself or in connection with the evidence with which it was proposed
to follow it up, was inadmissible: Costley v. State, 48 Md.
The general reputation in the neighborhood that the deceased was
jealous of his wife, could not possibly furnish any explanation of the
circumstances under which his life was taken, and was therefore not
admissible in evidence: Id.
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Personation of Juror.-Where, in a capital case, a person not sum-
moned as a juror personates one who was returned on the venire, sits at
the trial and joins in a verdict of guilty, the verdict will be set aside
and a new trial granted, it appearing that neither the accused nor his
counsel was guilty of laches : McGill v. The State, 34 Ohio St.
Verdict silent as to one of the Counts of the ndictment.-When an
indictment, in distinct counts, charges a rape and an attempt to commit
a rape upon the same person, referring to the same act, a verdict of
guilty as to either count amounts to an acquittal of the crime charged
in the other. The failure of the jury to make an express finding as to
the latter, therefore, is not error requiring a reversal of the judgment:
State v. Cofer, 68 Mo.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.
Assignment for Benefit of Creditors-Preference.-The right of a
debtor at common law to devote his whole estate to the satisfaction of
the claims of creditors results from that absolute ownership which every
man claims over that which is his own: Reed v. McIntyre, S. C. U. S.,
Oct. Term 1878.
Assignments of property for such purposes, not made with the intent
to hinder, delay or defraud creditors, were upheld at common law, even
where certain creditors were preferred in the distribution of the debtor's
effects: it1.
An assignment which had the effect to delay a creditor in the enforce-
ment of his demand by the ordinary process of law, was not, for that rea-
son alone, fraudulent and void. If not made with the intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud creditors, it was sustained at common law: Id.
Good Faith-Sale Fraudulent as against Creditors.-A purchaser's
good faith is not conclusively established by his uncontradicted testi-
mony. The question is for the jury: Molitor v. Robinson, 40 Mich.
A sale made by a debtor and not accompanied by immediate delivery
is only prima facie fraudulent as against his creditors, and not conclu-
sively so: Id.
EASEMENT. See Ejectment.
EJEOTMENT.
For Easements.-Ejectment does not lie to recover an incorporea
easement, such as the use of an alley: Taylor v. Gladwin, 40 Mich.
The recital of an incorporeal right in a judgment of ejectment is
nugatory and does not affect its validity: Id.
EQuITY. See Corporation; Spedfic Performance.
ignorance of Law.-Courts of equity may grant relief against acts
and contracts executed under mistake or in ignorance of natural facts,
but it is otherwise where a party wishes to avoid his act or deed on
the ground that he was ignorant of the law: Ignorantia legis non excu-
sat: Andreae v. Redfield, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1878.
Opening Decree to let in Defence.-Where a decree has been passed
by default, without a hearing upon the merits, a court of equity has
power, in the exercise of a sound discretion, to vacate the enrolment
in order to let in a meritorious defence, and this may be done upon pa-
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tition, without a bill of review or an original bill for fraud: First Na-
tional Bank v. Eccleston, 48 Md.
This discretion extends as well to the time when the petition is to be
filed as to the other circumstances creating a case : Id.
Will not relieve on a ground not stated in the Petition- Mistake.-
Plaintiff being the beneficiary in a mortgage in which the land intended
to be conveyed was not correctly described, brought his suit to have the
mistake corrected. The holder of a later mortgage, covering the saee
land, was made co-defendant with the mortgagor, the petition alleging
that he knew of the mistake when he took his mortgage; and this was
the only ground on which the pleadings placed the plaintiff's claim to
relief as against him. At the trial it appeared that the later mortgage
was given as security for a pre-existing debt. Plaintiff had judgment.
On appeal by the holder of the later mortgage, it. was contended, on
behalf of the plaintiff, that even if the appellant had no notice of the
earlier mortgage, as charged, still the judgment was right. since, the later
mortgage being given to secure a pre-existing debt, the appellant was
not a purchaser for a valuable consideration : Held, that the judgment
could not be sustained on this ground, no such case being made by the
pleadings ; and the court having, upon an examination of the evidence,
come to the conclusion that the appellant had no notice of the mistake,
reversed the judgment: Cox v. .Esteb, 68 Mo.
ESTOPPEL. See Corporation.
EVIDENCE. See Criminal Law.
Impeaching Party's own Witness.-The defendant after having intro-
duced the testimony of Jonathan Brock, his own witness, taken under a
commission issued by consent, offered Brock's previous letter to the
defendant, for the purpose of impeaching his credit: Held, that when
Brock was testifying under the commission, as the defendant's witness,
the opportunity was afforded the defendant of confronting him with his
letter, but failing to do so, he could not offer his letter at the trial for
the purpose of impeaching his credit: Sewell v. Gardner, 48 Md.
Where a witness gives evidence against the party calling him, who
was misled by the prior statements of the witness, the party is not bound
by whatever the witness may say, but he is permitted to call other wit-
nesses not to impeach him, but to contradict him as to a fact material to
the issue, in order to show how the fact really is; Id.
Party as Witness after death of other Party-Husband and Wfe.-
A widow having testified on her own offer and in her own behalf that
her signature and acknowledgment to a certain deed executed by her
and her former husband, were obtained from her by duress and fraud
on his part, it was objected that she was not a competent witness, after
the death of her husband, to testify that her signature to the deed was
procured by his fraud and violence: Reld, that the witness was compe-
tent; that such evidence was not excluded by the provision in the Evi-
dence Act that " when an original party to a contract or cause of action
is dead, either party may be called as a witness by his opponent, but
shall not be admitted to testify on his own offer :" First .National Bank
v. EccZeston, 48 Md.
FORmxR ADJUDICATION. See Mandamus.
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FRAUD. See Debtor and Creditor; Specfic Performance.
HABEAS CouPus. See Contempt.
HOMESTEAD.
Widow's Homestead-Dower.-A widow entitled to both homestead
and dower in land of her deceased husband, caused her dower to be
assigned, and accepted the assignment, but, being ignorant of her right
to a homestead, did not then claim it. Being administratrix of her
husband's estate, she also procured from the probate court an order for
the sale of all the lands of the estate, but no sale was ever made. In a
proceeding subsequently instituted by her to have her homestead set
out: Held, that her acts did not constitute either a waiver or an estoppel
so as to prevent her from asserting her right: Seek v. Baynes, 68 Mo.
INJUNCTION. See Mandamus.
INSURANCE.
Paid-up Poliy-Non-forfeiture.-In a life insurance policy the pay-
ment of premiums was to cease after ten years. The policy contained a
provision that, after two or more of the annual premiums had been fully
paid, the policy might be exchanged for a paid-up non-forfeiture policy,
for an amount equal to the sum of one-tenth of the amount insured for
each premium which had been so paid. A condition of the policy was
that, if the amount of any annual premium should not be fully paid on
the day and in the manner provided for, the policy should be "null and
void and wholly forfeited," and that in case the policy became null and
void, all paymeuts which had been made thereon should be forfeited to
the company: Held, that the right of the assured to exchange the
policy for a paid-up non-forfeiture policy was limited to the time during
which the policy was in force: Bussing's Executors v. Union .Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 34 Ohio St.
Stock Notes-Statute of Limitations.-The subscribers to the stock
of an insurance company organized under a special charter granted prior
to the adoption of the present constitution, gave to the corporation their
secured promissory notes, payable on demand, for the amount of the stock
by them respectively subscribed : Held, that the notes must be construed
in connection with the nature of the business of the corporation, and in
view of the object intended by the parties in giving their notes. Thus
construed, the notes were intended to be payable on the call of the
directors; and the Statute of Limitations is no more available as a defence
against the collection of the notes, than it would have been against the
collection of the subscriptions: Kilbreath v. Gaylord, 34 Ohio St.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS.
Damages caused in part by Sale of-Sunday.-The provision of the
act of 1870, which creates a liability on the part of the seller for an
injury resulting from intoxication, to which the liquor unlawfully sold
or furnished by him contributes only inpart, is not in conflict with the
constitution: Oibila v. Bahney, 34 Ohio St.
In an action brought bya married woman, under said amended section,
for an injury to her means of support in consequence of the intoxication
Vo.. XXVII.-58
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of her husband, it is not error for the court to refuse to charge that "if
the jury award the plaintiff any amount by way of exemplary damages,
they should not consider the fact, if such they find it to be, that certain
of the illegal sales were made on Sunday :" 1d.
JOINT DEBTOR. See Limitations, Statute of.
LAND DAMAGES. See Afunicipal Corporations.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
Grant of Reversimi-Mortgage.-It is a well-settled principle of the
common law that the grant of the reversion or an estate expectant on
the determination of a lease for years, passes to the grantee the rents
reserved in the lease as incident to the reversion: King v. Housatonic
Railroad Co., 45 Conn.
Since the statute of Anne, notice of the grant to the tenant has been
sufficient in the English courts to entitle the grantee to demand and
recover the rents. And that rule has been adopted by the courts of this
state,'and by those of many of our sister states: Id.
Where the grant of the reversion is by way of mortgage, the mort-
gagee, though entitled to the rents as incident to the reversion, may take
them or not at his election. If he allows the mortgagor to receive them,
and afterwards elects to take them himself, and gives notice of his
election to the tenant, he becomes entitled to all the rents accruing -after
the execution of the mortgage and in arrear and unpaid at the time of
the notice, as well as to those which accrue afterwards. But the
rents in arrear at the time the mortgage was executed belong to the
mortgagor: Id.
LMITArIONS, STATUTE OF. See Insurance.
Concealment of cause of Action.-It is no answer to a plea of the
Statute of Limitations that the cause of action was fraudulently concealed
by the defendant until after the statute had attached, and that the suit
was brought within the time limited by the statute after the discovery
of the right to sue: Andreae v. Redfield, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1878.
Oriminal withholding of Pension Money.-Whenever the act or series
of acts necessary to constitute a criminal withholding by an agent of
pension money have transpired, the crime is complete, and from that
day the Statute of Limitations begins to run against the prosecution:
United States v. Irvine, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1878.
Joint 1Promissors.-One joint maker of a note shall not lose the benefit
of the Statute of Limitations by reason of payments made by'another:
Rogers v. Anderson, 40 Mich.
Unexplained endorsements and endorsements written by or for the
payee are not sufficient proof to take a case out of the Statute of Limi-
tations: Id.
The admissions of one joint maker are not evidence against another: Id
Running when once commenced is not suspended by subsequent disability
---A cause of action having accrued and the Statute of Limitations
having commenced to run during the lifetime of the devisor of the
plaintiff: Held, that the running of the statute was not interrupted by
his subsequent decease and the descent of the right- of action to the
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plaintiffs, though minors at the time and under disability to sue : .Harrs
et al. v. McGovern et al., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1878.
When the statute once begins to run, it will continue to run without
being impeded by any subsequent disability: Id.
United States not barred.-A state statute cannot bar the United
States: United States v. Thompson et al., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1878.
MANDAMUS. See Action.
lInjunction to restrain Action at Law.-Mandamus will not lie to com-
pel a court to proceed with a trial that has been enjoined : People e.
rel. Ives v. Circuit Judge for Muskegon Co., 40 Mich.
The sufficiency of an injunction bill cannot be reviewed in collateral
proceedings : I'd.
MORTGAGE. See Landlord and Tenant.
Foreclosur.-A mortgage may be foreclosed for interest overdue on
the mortgage note, where the principal of the note is not yet due:
Butler v. Blackman, 45 Conn.
Priority of Mortgage for Purchase-money.-A mortgage given to a
vendor to secure an unpaid balance of purchase-money of.land and
recorded on the same day, has priority of one which is given by the
vendee, before he has concluded the purchase, to a person who furnishes
him the money to make the cash payments, notwithstanding the latter
is recorded first: Turk v. Funk, 68 Mo.
MuNIcIPAL BONDS.
County Bond Tax-Limitation of the Rate, part of the Contract.-
One who takes county bonds issued under a statute which limits the rate
of taxation that may be imposed for their payment to one-twentieth of
one per cent., is chargeable with knowledge of the limitation. It enters
into and forms part of the contract between him and the county; and
the county court cannot be compelled, by mandamus, to appropriate
other funds in the county treasury, raised for other purposes, to the
payment of such bonds. Neither the fact that they have been reduced
to judgment, nor the fact that the specific fund provided is inadequate,
can change this rule: State v. Macon County Court, 68 Mo.
The extraordinary indebtedness incurred by a county in issuing bonds
to pay a railroad subscription, is not one of the "expenses of the
county" within the meaning of Wag Stat., sect. .166, 1193, and cannot
be paid out of the fund raised by taxation under that section: Id.
The county court will not be compelled, by mandamus, to issue a
warrant on the common fund of the county for the payment of railroad
bonded indebtedness, when the result would be to withdraw from the
treasury all the funds necessary for the support of the county govern-
ment, and thus to disrupt and disorganize it: id.
When the county court has refused the application of a creditor of
the county, whose claim has been reduced to judgment, for a warrant on
the treasury payable out of a particular fund, it will not be compelled,
by mandamus, to change its decision and grant the warrant; 1st.
Because its action on the applIcation is judicial; 2d. Because an appeal
lies from its order to the Circuit Court: Id.
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The case of the United States ex rel. v. Clark Cbunty Court, 96 U.
S. Rep. 211, disapproved.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. See Action.
Cannot delegate its Legislative Powers- Wharves.-It is well settled
that the legislative powers of a municipal corporation cannot be dele-
gated. They are in the nature of public trusts conferred upon the
legislative assembly of the corporation for the public benefit, and cannot
be vicariously exercised. Hence, a city authorized by its charter to
erect, repair and regulate public wharves, and to fix the rate of wharfage
thereat, cannot lease its wharf, or farm* out its revenues, or empower
any one else to fix the rates of wharfage; and a contract whereby the
city undertakes to do these things is void: Xatthews v. City of Alex-
andria, 68 Mo.
Damage by grading Street.-The owner of a lot abutting on an unim-
proved street of a city or village, in erecting buildings thereon, assumes
the risk of all damage which may result from the subsequent grading
and improvement of the street by the municipal authorities, if made
within the reasonable exercise of their power: C'ty of Akron v. Cham-
berlain, Co., 34 Ohio St.
The liability of a municipality for injury to buildings on abutting lots
exists only where such buildings were erected with reference to a grade
actually established, either by ordinance or such improvement of the
street as fairly indicated that the grade was permanently fixed, and the
damage resulted from a change of such grade, or, where tho buildings,
if erected before a grade was so established, were injured by the subse-
quent establishment of an unreasonable grade: Id.
Whether a grade be unreasonable or not, must be determined by the
circumstances existing at the time the grade was established and not by
the circumstances existing at the time the abutting lots may have been
improved: Td.
Within the principle of municipal liability, as above stated, is the
case where a lot is improved in anticipation of, and with reference to, a
reasonable future grade which is afterward established, and damage
results from a subsequent change in the grade : Id.
Paramount right over its Streets for the purpose of constructing Sewers
-The use of a Street for Railway purposes subject to such paramount
right.-On a bill for an injunction to restrain the appellants from removing
the railway tracks of the appellee on a portion of Carey street, in the
city of Baltimore, the object of such removal being to construct a sewer
under the bed of said street, in pursuance of a contract made by the
appellants with the city authorities, it was Hfeld, That in the exercise
of the power to construct sewers they bad the right not only to obstruct,
but to discontinue entirely the use of Carey street as a highway, so long
as it might be necessary for the purpose of constructing a sewer under
the bed of the street: Kirby v Citizens' Railway (7o., 48 Md.
Held further, That the easement of appellee was subject to this par-
amount right, and in constructing its railway the appellee knew, or was
bound to know, that its use of the bed of the street for railway pur-
poses, was liable at any time to be interfered with, whenever the city
authorities might deem it necessary for the public welfare: Id.
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The power being lawful in itself, it could only become unlawful in
consequence of the mode in which it was carried into execution. It
was apparent from the bill in this case that the sewer could not be
constructed without interfering with the railway track, and whatever
injury might result therefrom must be regarded in law as "damnum
obsgue injuria." Id.
NATIONAL BANK.
Competency to hold Real Estate-Mortyage.-Every loan or discount
by a bank is made in good faith, in reliance, by way of security, upon
the real or personal property of the obligors, and unless the title by
mortgage or conveyance is taken to the bank directly, for its use, the
case is not within the prohibition of the statute. The fact that the title
or security may inure indirectly to the security and benefit of the bank
will not vitiate the transaction: Union National Bank et al. v. Matthews,
S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1878.
Where a corporation is incompetent by its charter to take a title to
real estate, a conveyance to it is not void, but only voidable, and the
sovereign alone can object. It is valid until assailed in a direct pro-
ceeding instituted for that purpose : Id.
NEw TRIAL.
In Criminal Case.-Upon a petition for a new trial for newly-dis-
covered evidence, after a conviction for a rape, it was .eld, 1. That the
fact of the evidence of the newly-discovered evidence could not be
proved by mere ezparte affidavits. 2. That new evidence was not suffi-
cient that merely went to show that the principal witness had before the
trial made a statement inconsistent with that made on the trial. 3. Nor
that which showed that the witness (the victim of the rape), had altered
her opinion as to the petitioner being the person who committed .the
crime, where the change of opinion originated in a suggestion by another
and was arrived at by a process of reasoning: Shields v. The State,
45 Conn.
It is a general rule that a new trial will not be granted upon the mere
after-recollection of a former witness: 1d.
Motion not reviewable on Appeal.-The motion for a new trial being
addressed to the discretion of the court, its action thereon cannot be
reviewed on appeal: Zitzer v. Jones, 48 Md.
PARTNERSHIP.
Partnership promise topay a Third Person's Debt-Accommodation
Endorsements-Declarations and Admissions of Partners.-A partner
is not bound by an accommodation endorsement made in the name of
his firm, but without his assent: .Heffron v. Hanaford, 40 Mich.
A partner's declarations cannot bind his associates in concerns foreign
to the partnership, nor can his admissions bring such matters within
the scope of the business: Id.
A note was given by a debtor to an execution-creditor to obtain a
release from a levy, and was endorsed in the. name of a firm by one of
the partners. There was no showing that the firm received any consid-
eratiou, or that one of the partners consented to the endorsement: Held,
that it must be presumed that it was purely an accommodation endorse-
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meat, and that the creditor, who of. course was not a bona fide holder,
was privy to all the facts : Id.
Where the authority of a partner to speak for his associates is not
shown, his statements, so far as concerns them, are mere hearsay : Id.
PAYMENT. See Action.
RALmROAD. See Municipal Corporations; Taxation.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES.
After .New lrial Granted.-A cause can be removed from a state
court to the Circuit Court after a trial and judgment in the state court
if before the removal the first judgment has been set aside or vacated,
and the right to a new trial perfected : Chicago and Northwestern Rail-
way Co. v. McKinley, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1878.
SET-OFF.
Joint and separate Debts.-The general rule in equity, as at law, is,
that joint debts can not be set off against separate debts, unless there be
some special equity justifying it: Second National Bank v. Hemingray,
34 Ohio St.
If there are such equities, the bankruptcy of the party against whom
they exist, is sufficient ground for the allowance of the set-off against
notes not due at the time of the assignment.
Where a banker induced a firm to continue its deposit account with
him, by deceptively holding himself out as being still the holder of
several negotiable notes made to him by the principal member of the
firm, when in fact he had assigned them as collateral security for a debt,
and there was an understanding between the firm and the banker, from
the* course of dealing between them, that the notes of the individual
members were to be paid through the deposit account of the firm, and
which he had a right to treat as his own for that and other purposes;
on the bankruptcy of the banker, Held, That after satisfying the debt
for which the notes of the individual member were held as security, the
latter, as against the assignees of the bankrupt, is in equity entitled to
set off the firm account against the balance due on the notes; Id.
In an action on a negotiable note which the plaintiff holds by assign-
meat before due, in consideration of, and as collateral security for a loan
made by him to the insolvent payee, against whom the maker is entitled
to an equitable set-off to the note, the plaintiff will be limited in his
recovery against the maker to the amount of the debt which the note
secures, and will not, in addition thereto, be allowed the amount of his
attorney's fees in prosecuting the action: .d.
SLANDER.
Action by Husband and Wife for charging the Wife with Adultery-
Words actionable per se- What is not special Damage.-In suits for
slander, pecuniary loss to the plaintiff is the gist of the action, and
courts at an early day recognised a distinction between words actionable,
and -words not actionable in themselves. In the former, the law presumes
pecuniary loss, whilst in the latter it is wecessary to prove special damage
to the plaintiff : Shajer v. Ahalt, 48 Md.
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When one charges another with the commission of an offence, it must
be such an offence as subjects the party to corporal punishment, in order
to render the words actionable per se: Id.
The crime of adultery is not so punishable, and hence to charge one
with adultery is not actionable per se, and the plaintiff must prove special
damage: .d.
Special damage in such cases is that which is naturally the conse-
quence of the words spoken, and not such as is occasional and accidental.
Sickness of the person slandered, resulting from the slanderous charge,
is not sufficient to prove special damage : Id.
SPECIFIC PERFORBIANCE.
Mistake and Fraudulent Representation as Defences.-Where the facts
would preclude an original contracting party from claiming specific
performance because it would operate as a fraud on the defendant, no
person claiming through him can assert a better right without showing
that he is a bonafide purchaser: Berry v. Whitney, 
40 Mich. -.
Mistake may be shown by parol as a defence to the specific perform-
ance of a written instrument: Id'
Fraudulent representations as to the legal effect of an instrument will
avoid it, even if made to one who has actually read it, if unable to
judge of its true construction. But the fraud must be contemporaneous
with the execution of the instrument and must consist in obtaining the
assent of the party defrauded, by inducing a false impression as to its
legal or literal nature and operation : Id.
A mortgagor gave a warranty deed of the land, subject to the mort-
gage. A woman acting through her husband bought it from his grantee.
The mortgage was foreclosed and the mortgagor bid in the land. The
woman filed a bill to remove the cloud from her title and to compel the
mortgagor to convey to her the interest he receiveO. by the foreclosure
sale. The court found that she was not a bona fide purchaser without
notice that the land was sold subject to the mortgage, and held that it
would be unjust to compel a conveyance without payment of the mort-
gage, and dismissed the bill with costs: Id.
STATUTE. See Constitutional Law.
STREET. See Municipal Corporation.
SURETY.
Good Faith towards.-If a principal, having knowledge, or a belief
founded on reasonable and reliable information, that his agent is a
defaulter, requires sureties for his fidelity in the future, and holds him
out as a trustworthy person, whereby such security is obtained, he can-
not afterwards avail himself of a guaranty so obtained from a person
who was ignorant of what was known to, and ought to have been dis-
closed by, the employer: Dinsmore v. Sidball, 34 Ohio St.
TAXATION.
Exemption from- Constitutional Law.-The act incorporating the
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, provides "that the said road or
roads with all their works, improvements and profits, and all, the ma-
chinery of transportation used on said road, are hereby vested in the
said company, incorporated by this act, and their successors for ever; and
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the shares of the capital stock of the said company shall be deemed and
considered personal estate, and shall be exempt from the imposition of
any tax or burden." Neither the act of incorporation nor the constitu-
tion of the state then in force, contained any provision reserving to the
legislature the right to repeal or amead the charter of the company.
Held: 1. That the exemption from taxation granted in the charter of
the company, was a contract between the state and the corporators,
within the protection of the Constitution of the United States, and
therefore beyond the power of a subsequent legislature to repeal or in
any manner impair. 2. That under the foregoing section of the act
incorporating the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, the property
and' franchises of the company were exempt from taxation; and the
franchises being exempt, the gross receipts derived from "the exercise of
such franchises were also exempt: State v. B. & 0. Railroad ab.,
48 Md.
The gross receipts of the entire road of the defendant from Baltimore
to the Ohio river, ancl the gross receipts derived from the lateral roads
built by the defendant, and from all buildings and works necessary and
expedient to the operation of its road, were exempt from the impo-
sition of any tax or burthen; and this too whether said road or roads
and buildings and works were constructed with money derived from the
subscription to its capital stock, or from sales of its shares of stock, or
from money borrowed and secured by mortgage, or from the undis-
tributed profits of the company, or from all these sources combined: Id.The buildings and works necessary and expedient to the operation ofthe road within the meaning of the defendant's charter, were such
buildings and works as were reasonably convenient and appropriate tothe maintenance and operation of the road: Id.
The elevators, wharves, piers and docks owned by the defendant were
necessary for its business as a common carrier for the purposes of receiv-ing and storing grain and freight shipped over its road after the same
had reached the place of destination, and previous to its delivery to the
consignee or owner * but as such common carrier it had no right to own
and use these structures for the storage of grain and freight after theowner or consignee bad had a reasonable time to remove the same: Id.
While the defendant was not authorized by its charter to build and
conduct hotels for the accommodation of the public generally, hotels or
buildings for the accommodation of passengers over its road, were neces-
sary to its business, and therefore within its charter: Id.
TRIAL.
_in miting number of Witnesses.-I an action for slander in charging
the plaintiff with dishonesty, the defendant, for the purpose of lessening
the damages, offered evidence of the plaintiff's bad reputation in that
respect The court limited him to ten witnesses. cheld to be a ground
for granting a new trial : Ward v. Dch, 45 Conn.
UNiTeD STATe s COUTS. See onstiui b al Law.
